



# Canadian Real Estate: A Strategic Shield Against Monetary Debasement

## Introduction & Key Highlights

The Canadian real estate investment landscape has fundamentally shifted in the years surrounding the global financial crisis ("GFC"), rendering many of the traditional pre-GFC playbooks obsolete. What lies ahead is not a traditional market cycle driven by the economy, but a structural regime shift propelled by a silent force that most investors overlook.

This white paper tours the long-term macroeconomic roadmap, consisting of a chain of nine powerful forces, each beginning with the letter 'D', that cascade like dominoes to reveal a clear and investable pattern in Canada's core real estate market. In essence, aging demographics emerge from the earliest dominoes as a slow-moving yet irreversible force that acts as a structural drag on long-term growth. Culminating near the end is *debasement* – a deliberate, structural dilution of money as policymakers attempt to reconcile aging populations with unsustainable debt.

In this current new regime, Canadian real estate is no longer just a yield play. It is a strategic “shield.” A repricing mechanism. A scarce store of value that responds almost mechanically to debasement, adjusting upward in price to reflect declining value changes in the denominator – money itself.


## Domino #1 Declining Birth Rates



It all starts with the first and most foundational 'D' domino: declining birth rates.

Figure 1

### Canadian Births per Woman<sup>1</sup>



Source: Macrotrends (July 2025).

**Figure 1** shows Canada's births per woman since 1950. Birth rates have declined dramatically, from nearly four births per woman during the elated post-World War II Baby Boom era (officially 1946–1964), to just 1.5 births today. That's well below the 2.1 replacement rate, which is the threshold needed to maintain a stable population without immigration.

### So, why is this important?

This trend is global, not just Canadian. Nearly every developed country is below population replacement level, and many emerging economies are converging toward that path more quickly than anticipated.<sup>2</sup>


## Domino #2 Demographics Are Aging



As birth rates decline, the inevitable consequence is demographics that are aging.

Figure 2

### Canada's Population Percentage (%) Over 65 Years Old and Median Age<sup>3</sup>



Source: Statistics Canada (September 2025).

**Figure 2** clearly highlights this result through two key trends:

1. The percentage of Canada's population over age 65
2. The median age of the population

Both have moved steadily upward since the early 1970s. The over-65 cohort has more than doubled from just under 8% of the population in 1971 to over 19% today. Meanwhile, the median age has jumped from 26 to 41.

This isn't a future challenge, it's today's. Canada is now a full-fledged aging society, and this is just the front edge of the aging curve because the Baby Boomer generation, the largest demographic cohort in Canadian history, continues to advance through its retirement wave.




## Domino #3 Decreasing Labour Force Participation Rate



The next fallen domino is a direct consequence of the aging demographic trend:  
a structural decrease in the labour force participation rate.

Figure 3

### Canada's Birth Rates Lead Labour Force Participation Rates<sup>4</sup>



Sources: Macrotrends (July 2025); Statistics Canada (August 2025).

Labour force participation measures the share of the population aged 15 and over that is actively working or seeking work. The light blue line in **Figure 3** shows Canada's labour force participation rate trending lower over the past two decades. The darker line shows the birth rate per 1,000 people shifted forward by 15 years to highlight the lagged effect that fewer births have on future workforce entrants.

Fewer births today mean fewer new workers 15 years from now. Because birth rates have been falling steadily for decades, the participation rate has decreased and will continue to do so until 2040. It's a demographic inevitability. It can't reverse overnight since it takes 15 years to make a 15-year-old. Even Canada's record immigration has proved unsuccessful at reversing this trend.

Labour force participation was a core driver of the economic growth that peaked just as the first wave of Baby Boomers reached retirement ages around the 2008–2009 GFC. With fewer workers entering the labour pool, the economy now faces a structural constraint on productive capacity, even in sectors like real estate, where robust investment and technological advancements alone cannot compensate for a shrinking construction workforce. With no relief in sight, Canada and the developed world face a prolonged period of structurally weaker growth, which leads to deflating gross domestic product ("GDP") growth.


## Domino #4 Deflating Growth Rate Trend



The consequence of an aging, shrinking workforce becomes clear:  
a long-term deflation in Canada's GDP growth rate trend.

Figure 4

Canada's Real GDP Growth Rate Year Over Year<sup>5</sup>



Source: Statistics Canada (August 2025).

**Figure 4** tracks year-over-year ("Y/Y") real GDP growth since the 1960s, and the red trendline tells the story. Where growth once averaged closer to 5% in the post-war decades, it has now fallen to under 2% and continues to steadily deflate.

Growth is fundamentally a function of labour, capital and productivity. With labour force participation decreasing and demographic tailwinds turning into headwinds, the economy's

potential output is permanently lowered. Productivity gains may help, but they haven't proved enough to offset the demographic drag.

Structurally, lower growth creates serious problems for fiscal sustainability, leading to the next domino: deficits persistently piling up.


## Domino #5 Deficits Are Piling Up



Figure 5 shows Canada's quarterly fiscal balance as a percentage of GDP.

Figure 5

### Canadian Government Surplus or Deficit Percentage (%) of GDP<sup>6</sup>



Source: Statistics Canada (August 2025).

While there's always some natural fiscal cycling around recessions, what stands out is the gradual downward drift of the trendline, driving Canada into structural deficit territory.

The core reason for this isn't a one-off event like the COVID crisis or a mismanaged budget: it's demographic math. As the population ages, fewer people are working to create growth and pay income taxes, while more are drawing from social safety nets. The formula is unavoidable – less revenue, more spending, structurally wider deficits.

Even in the best of times, the Canadian government is finding it difficult to run fiscal surpluses. And during periods of economic stress, like 2020, deficits explode – hitting an extreme of 22% of GDP. This isn't just a cyclical gap that can be closed with austerity or a growth spurt. It's a structural mismatch between what the government takes in and what it must spend.




## Domino #6 Debt-to-GDP Spiraling Out of Control



The cumulative effect of persistent deficits and slowing growth is an unsustainable rise in public debt.

Figure 6

Canadian Government Debt-to-GDP Ratio (%) (Gross)<sup>7</sup>



Source: Statistics Canada (September 2025).

After a brief period of stabilization leading up to the GFC, debt levels have resumed a long-term upward trend, reaching 129% of GDP and showing no signs of reversing.

As **Figure 6** demonstrates, this is what a debt spiral looks like. When the economy slows and spending obligations remain elevated – particularly in areas like healthcare, pensions and

interest payments – governments are forced to borrow more just to stay afloat. Continued borrowing raises debt levels, which pressures interest costs, further squeezing fiscal space. With government debt structurally growing faster than GDP, any economic disruption can cause fragile debt ratios to spike, as evidenced during the COVID crisis in 2020-21.




## Domino #7 Default Risk Rises as Aging Demographics Continue Weighing on Debts



**Figure 7** zooms in on the direct relationship between aging demographics and debt levels as the former continues to weigh on the latter.

Figure 7

**Labour Force Participation Rate Leads Government Debt-to-GDP Ratio (%)<sup>8</sup>**



Sources: Statistics Canada (August 2025; September 2025).

What the figure above shows is both intuitive and statistically powerful: as the labour force participation rate decreases, the government debt-to-GDP ratio rises, increasing default risk. The dark blue line represents the labour force participation rate with a two-quarter lead, while the light blue line shows the debt-to-GDP ratio (inverted for visual clarity). They're mathematically intertwined. The correlation is strong with a  $R^2$  of 0.75, meaning three-quarters of the variance in debt levels can be explained by changes in labour force participation.

So, this chart reinforces what was already established: rising debt isn't just about bad policy or cyclical downturns, it's the downstream effect of a shrinking workforce and a growing dependency ratio. The result is a government budget increasingly consumed by debt service and entitlements.

And with traditional growth or austerity strategies unable to meaningfully reverse this trajectory, governments inevitably look to the path of least resistance – debasement of the money.




## Domino #8 Debasement of the Money to Pay Interest That Is Crowding Out the Fiscal Budget



At this stage of the macroeconomic dominoes, we arrive at the fiscal endgame – “fiat” monetary debasement. With rising debt levels and growing interest burdens, there’s not enough growth to service the interest. Eventually, governments turn to the only lever they still control: the money supply.

Figure 8

### Quarterly Interest Payments on Government Debt Leads M1 Money Supply<sup>9</sup>



Sources: Fiera Real Estate (September 2025); The Globe and Mail (January 2025); Statistics Canada (June 2025; August 2025).

**Figure 8** shows the relationship between quarterly interest payments on government debt (dark blue line, shifted 10 quarters ahead) and M1 money supply (light blue line), which includes currency in circulation and chequable deposits,<sup>10</sup> a basic measure of liquidity.

As interest costs on the public debt rise, the central bank responds often predictably by increasing liquidity in the system. Resultingly, commercial banks have more bank reserves to lend against and create new deposits. This increased credit availability, particularly in the mortgage market, serves as the direct transmission channel into real estate. This is not coincidental; it’s functional. Higher interest expenses begin to crowd out other spending priorities,

increasing fiscal pressure on government budgets. To relieve that pressure, the money printer turns back on.

**Figure 8** shows that the recent uptick in M1 appears to be accelerating right on the redzone cue as government interest expense exploded higher 10 quarters ago from rolling over debt at post-COVID interest rates that were significantly higher than prior cycles. That response isn’t unique to Canada; it’s a pattern that has played out repeatedly across developed economies and empires over centuries. The United States has the same chart with a similar lead-time.<sup>11</sup> What’s key here is the subtlety: an opaque tax on savers as the *real* value of their money is diluted and quietly transferred to bailout the government.




## Domino #9 Direct Defender of Debasement: Real Estate Is a Debasement Store of Value, Nearly Tick-for-Tick



At this juncture, the core investment insight is revealed: when monetary debasement becomes an inherent policy feature, not a bug, Canadian core real estate emerges as a direct defender of debasement.

Figure 9

Canadian Core Real Estate Performance is Led by Expanding M1 Money Supply<sup>12</sup>



Sources : Fiera Real Estate (September 2025); MSCI/REALPAC Canada Quarterly Property Fund Index – Total Return Index (August 2025); Statistics Canada (August 2025).

**Figure 9** captures the final domino in the sequence observed so far – from declining birth rates to rising debts to structural debasement. The dark blue line shows M1 money supply, leading the MSCI/REALPAC Canada Quarterly Property Fund Index (“MSCI PFI”) Total Return Index by four quarters, reflecting the natural lag between liquidity creation and private core real estate repricing.

The fit is extraordinary – a correlation  $R^2$  of 0.97. More liquidity equals more real estate returns, nearly tick-for-tick. Why? Real estate is a scarce, income-producing, hard asset priced in nominal dollar terms, whose total supply cannot expand nearly

as quickly or effortlessly as the money supply. Unlike financial assets that can be created with a keystroke, real estate is *real* and rooted in physical reality. Its value is tied to land, labour, materials and location. It reflects the *real* economy, not abstract financial engineering. So, when money is diluted, real estate absorbs the debasement to reflect the diminished value of each dollar and reprices higher.

Importantly, the latest data shows both liquidity and real estate returns turning up again, suggesting **Canadian core real estate is entering the early stages of a new, powerful upcycle.**

## The ‘D’ Domino Sequence

The flow chart visual below (Figure 10) provides the recap of the ‘D’ domino sequence.


It begins where the structural story starts – declining birth rates. From there, each domino falls logically and causally into the next: an aging population, a shrinking labour force, slower economic growth, widening deficits and ultimately, a debt spiral.

That debt spiral leads governments to a monetary crossroads and instead of austerity or growth-led rebalancing, they increasingly turn to debasement as the politically expedient option. And it’s

here that the investment story emerges – Canadian core real estate doesn’t merely withstand the pressures of this new regime; it benefits as a *shield*.

However, notice the loop of Figure 10. The story doesn’t end with real estate returns. The very conditions driven by monetary debasement – high housing costs and, ultimately, a rising cost of living – feed back into the original problem, discouraging family formation and suppressing future birth rates. This creates a vicious cycle that reinforces itself.

Figure 10  
 The ‘D’ Domino Sequence




For illustrative purposes only.



Since its inception, Fiera Real Estate has synthesized this intelligence into a proprietary predictive composite for forecasting future cycle performance of diversified Canadian core real estate (as measured by the MSCI PFI).

Figure 11

### Fiera Real Estate's Predictive Composite<sup>13</sup>



Sources: Fiera Real Estate (September 2025).

Disclaimer: Fiera Real Estate's Predictive Composite provides a quarterly forward simulation of expected returns for Canadian core real estate, benchmarked against the MSCI/REALPAC Canada Quarterly Property Fund Index ("MSCI PFI"). The model is driven by proprietary leading macroeconomic indicators, capturing shifts in monetary liquidity, economic activity, and valuation conditions across the real estate cycle. The composite and benchmark are not investable indices and do not reflect management fees or fund operating expenses. The benchmark reflects gross total returns, inclusive of all quarterly distributions and capital appreciation. There is no guarantee that these results could have been or will be achieved. Past performance, whether actual or hypothetical, is not indicative of future results.

**Figure 11** displays the track record of this vital forecasting tool used for differentiating Fiera Real Estate from more commoditized research approaches that overlook liquidity cycles. Fiera Real Estate is confident that real estate stands to benefit from structural debasement tailwinds, but in managing an open-ended fund, maintaining quarterly fund liquidity remains paramount.

This forward-looking model empowers Fiera Real Estate to strategically play both offense and defense, positioning proactively during periods of opportunity and defensively when caution is warranted. The predicted performance path for Canadian core real estate remains compelling from here.

## Conclusion

A new macroeconomic regime is here, one no longer governed by cyclical fluctuations in the economy but by systematic and predictable monetary debasement. In Canada, as across much of the developed world, demographic drag, rising fiscal strain and quiet monetary dilution are redefining the investment landscape. Traditional economic signals are less predictive, while change in the quantity of money has emerged as the dominant force, explaining why many investors were caught off guard during the COVID-era rebound, expecting bearish outcomes in the face of economic uncertainty while real estate prices soared on the back of unprecedented liquidity.

**At Fiera Real Estate, we view Canadian core real estate not only as a reliable source of yield, but as a strategic store of value in this new regime. Its scarcity, income stability and sensitivity to monetary conditions make it uniquely suited to continue to seek to "shield" against the debasement of purchasing power that has recently re-emerged.**



## Sources

- 1 Canada Fertility Rate. Macrotrends, July 2025 – <https://www.macrotrends.net/global-metrics/countries/can/canada/fertility-rate>
- 2 Fertility Rate. Macrotrends, July 2025 – <https://www.macrotrends.net/global-metrics/countries/can/canada/fertility-rate>
- 3 "Population estimates on July 1, by age and gender." Statistics Canada, September 24, 2025 – <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=1710000501>
- 4 Canada Birth Rate. Macrotrends, July 2025 – <https://www.macrotrends.net/global-metrics/countries/can/canada/fertility-rate>  
"Labour force characteristics, monthly, seasonally adjusted and trend-cycle." (June 2025) Statistics Canada, August 8, 2025 – <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=1410028701>
- 5 "Gross domestic product, expenditure-based, Canada, quarterly (x 1,000,000)." Statistics Canada, August 29, 2025 – <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=3610010401&pickMembers%5B0%5D=2.1&pickMembers%5B1%5D=3.1&cubeTimeFrame.startMonth=01&cubeTimeFrame.startYear=2024&cubeTimeFrame.endMonth=04&cubeTimeFrame.endYear=2025&referencePeriods=20240101%2C20250401>
- 6 "Revenue, expenditure and budgetary balance — General governments (x 1,000,000)." Statistics Canada, August 29, 2025 – <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=3610047701>
- 7 "Financial indicators of general government sector, national balance sheet accounts." Statistics Canada, September 11, 2025 – <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=3810023701>
- 8 "Labour force characteristics, monthly, seasonally adjusted and trend-cycle." (June 2025) Statistics Canada, August 8, 2025 – <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=1410028701>  
"Financial indicators of general government sector, national balance sheet accounts." Statistics Canada, September 11, 2025 – <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=3810023701>  
Internal Calculation – Correlation R<sup>2</sup>. Fiera Real Estate, September 4, 2025
- 9 "Statement of government operations and balance sheet, government finance statistics, quarterly (x 1,000,000)." Statistics Canada, June 27, 2025 – <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=1010001501&pickMembers%5B0%5D=2.1&cubeTimeFrame.startMonth=01&cubeTimeFrame.startYear=2005&cubeTimeFrame.endMonth=10&cubeTimeFrame.endYear=2024&referencePeriods=20050101%2C20241001>  
"Chartered bank assets and liabilities and monetary aggregates, month-end, seasonally adjusted, Bank of Canada (x 1,000,000)." (June 2025) Statistics Canada, August 19, 2025 – <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=1010011601&cubeTimeFrame.startMonth=12&cubeTimeFrame.startYear=2003&cubeTimeFrame.endMonth=12&cubeTimeFrame.endYear=2024&referencePeriods=20031201%2C20241201>  
"Bank of Canada to end quantitative tightening within months, turning page on pandemic bond market policy." The Globe and Mail, January 16, 2025 – <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/article-bank-of-canada-ends-pandemic-quantitative-tightening/>  
Internal Calculation – Correlation R<sup>2</sup>. Fiera Real Estate, September 4, 2025
- 10 "Narrow money (M1)." OECD, September 4, 2025 – <https://www.oecd.org/en/data/indicators/narrow-money-m1.html>
- 11 "Federal government current expenditures: Interest payments (A091RC1Q027SBEA)." Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED), August 28, 2025 – <https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/A091RC1Q027SBEA>; "Monetary Base: Total (BOGMBASE)." Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED), August 26, 2025 – <https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BOGMBASE>
- 12 "Chartered bank assets and liabilities and monetary aggregates, month-end, seasonally adjusted, Bank of Canada (x 1,000,000)." (June 2025) Statistics Canada, August 19, 2025 – <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=1010011601&cubeTimeFrame.startMonth=12&cubeTimeFrame.startYear=2003&cubeTimeFrame.endMonth=12&cubeTimeFrame.endYear=2024&referencePeriods=20031201%2C20241201>  
MSCI/REALPAC Canada Quarterly Property Fund Index – Total Return Index. MSCI Real Asset Analytics Portal, August 6, 2025 – <https://one.msci.com/realassetsindexes/fundIndexes>  
Internal Calculation – Correlation R<sup>2</sup>. Fiera Real Estate, September 4, 2025
- 13 Proprietary Predictive Composite. Fiera Real Estate, September 4, 2025

## Contact Information



**Michael Le Coche**

Vice President, Research & Predictive Analytics  
Fiera Real Estate Investments Limited

[fierarealestate.com](http://fierarealestate.com)

## Important Disclosure

Fiera Capital Corporation ("**Fiera Capital**") is a global independent asset management firm that delivers customized multi-asset solutions across public and private classes to institutional, financial intermediary and private wealth clients across North America, Europe and key markets in Asia and the Middle East. Fiera Capital trades under the ticker FSZ on the Toronto Stock Exchange. Fiera Capital does not provide investment advice to U.S. clients or offer investment advisory services in the US. In the US, asset management services are provided by Fiera Capital's affiliates who are investment advisers that are registered with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC") or exempt from registration. Registration with the SEC does not imply a certain level of skill or training. Each affiliated entity (each an "**Affiliate**") of Fiera Capital only provides investment advisory or investment management services or offers investment funds in the jurisdictions where the Affiliate and/or the relevant product is registered or authorized to provide services pursuant to an exemption from registration.

This document is strictly confidential and for discussion purposes only. Its contents must not be disclosed or redistributed directly or indirectly, to any party other than the person to whom it has been delivered and that person's professional advisers.

The information presented in this document, in whole or in part, is not investment, tax, legal or other advice, nor does it consider the investment objectives or financial circumstances of any investor. The source of all information is Fiera Capital unless otherwise stated.

Fiera Capital and its Affiliates reasonably believe that this document contains accurate information as at the date of publication; however, no representation is made that the information is accurate or complete and it may not be relied upon. Fiera Capital and its Affiliates will accept no liability arising from the use of this document.

Fiera Capital and its Affiliates do not make recommendations to buy or sell securities or investments in marketing materials. Dealing and/or advising services are only offered to qualified investors pursuant to applicable securities laws in each jurisdiction.

**Past performance of any fund, strategy or investment is not an indication or guarantee of future results. Performance information assumes the reinvestment of all investment income and distributions and does not account for any fees or income taxes paid by the investor. All investments have the potential for loss. Target returns are forward-looking, do not represent actual performance, there is no guarantee that such performance will be achieved and actual results may vary substantially.**

This document may contain "forward-looking statements" which reflect the current expectations of Fiera Capital and/or its Affiliates. These statements reflect current beliefs, expectations and assumptions with respect to future events and are based on information currently available. Although based upon what Fiera Capital and its affiliates believe to be reasonable assumptions, there is no guarantee that actual results, performance, or achievements will be consistent with these forward-looking statements. There is no obligation for Fiera Capital and/or its Affiliates to update or alter any forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise.

Strategy data such as ratios and other measures which may be presented herein are for reference only and may be used by prospective investors to evaluate and compare the strategy. Other metrics are available and should be considered prior to investment as those provided herein are the subjective choice of the manager. The weighting of such subjective factors in a different manner would likely lead to different conclusions. Please note it is not possible to invest directly in an index.

Strategy details, including holdings and exposure data, as well as other characteristics, are as of the date noted and subject to change. Specific holdings identified are not representative of all holdings and it should not be assumed that the holdings identified were or will be profitable.

Certain fund or strategy performance and characteristics may be compared with those of well-known and widely recognized indices. Holdings may differ significantly from the securities that comprise the representative index. It is not possible to invest directly in an index. Investors pursuing a strategy like an index may experience higher or lower returns and will bear the cost of fees and expenses that will reduce returns, whereas an index does not. Generally, an index that is used to compare performance of a fund or strategy, as applicable, is the closest aligned regarding composition, volatility, or other factors.

Every investment is subject to various risks and such risks should be carefully considered by prospective investors before they make any investment decision. No investment strategy or risk management technique can guarantee returns or eliminate risk in every market environment. Each investor should read all related constating documents and/or consult their own advisors as to legal, tax, accounting, regulatory and related matters prior to making an investment.

The ESG or impact goals, commitments, incentives and initiatives outlined in this document are purely voluntary, may have limited impact on investment decisions and/or the management of investments and do not constitute a guarantee, promise or commitment regarding actual or potential positive impacts or outcomes associated with investments made by funds managed by the firm. The firm has established and may in the future establish, certain ESG or impact goals, commitments, incentives and initiatives, including but not limited to those relating to diversity, equity and inclusion and greenhouse gas emissions reductions. Any ESG or impact goals, commitments, incentives and initiatives referenced in any information, reporting or disclosures published by the firm are not being promoted and do not bind any investment decisions made in respect of, or stewardship of, any funds managed by the firm for the purposes of Article 8 of Regulation (EU) 2019/2088 on sustainability-related disclosures, in the financial services sector. Any measures implemented in respect of such ESG or impact goals, commitments, incentives and initiatives may not be immediately applicable to the investments of any funds managed by the firm and any implementation can be overridden or ignored at the sole discretion of the firm. There can be no assurance that ESG policies and procedures as described herein, including policies and procedures related to responsible investment or the application of ESG-related criteria or reviews to the investment process will continue; such policies and procedures could change, even materially, or may not be applied to a particular investment.

The following risks may be inherent in the funds and strategies mentioned on these pages.

**Equity risk:** the value of stock may decline rapidly and can remain low indefinitely. **Market risk:** the market value of a security may move up or down based upon a change in market or economic conditions. **Liquidity risk:** the strategy may be unable to find a buyer for its investments when it seeks to sell them. **General risk:** any investment that has the possibility for profits also has the possibility of losses, including loss of principal. **ESG and Sustainability risk** may result in a material negative impact on the value of an investment and performance of the portfolio. **Geographic concentration risk** may result in performance being more strongly affected by any conditions affecting those countries or regions in which the portfolio's assets are concentrated. **Investment portfolio risk:** investing in portfolios involves certain risks an investor would not face if investing in markets directly. **Currency risk:** returns may increase or decrease as a result of currency fluctuations. **Operational risk** may cause losses as a result of incidents caused by people, systems and/or processes. **Projections and Market Conditions:** We may rely upon projections developed by the investment manager or a portfolio entity concerning a portfolio investment's future performance. Projections are inherently subject to uncertainty and factors beyond the control of the manager and the portfolio entity. **Regulation:** The manager's operations may be subject to extensive general and industry specific laws and regulations. Private strategies are not subject to the same regulatory requirements as registered strategies. **No Market:** The LP Units are being sold on a private placement basis in reliance on exemptions from prospectus and registration requirements of applicable securities laws and are subject to restrictions on transfer thereunder. Please refer to the Confidential Private Placement Memorandum for additional information on the risks inherent in the funds and strategies mentioned herein. **Meteorological and Force Majeure Events Risk:** Certain infrastructure assets are dependent on meteorological and atmospheric conditions or may be subject to catastrophic events and other events of force majeure. **Weather:** Weather represents a significant operating risk affecting the agriculture and forestry industry. **Commodity prices:** Cash flow and operating results of the strategy are highly dependent on agricultural commodity prices which can be expected to fluctuate significantly over time. **Water:** Water is of primary importance to agricultural production. **Third Party Risk:** The financial returns may be adversely affected by the reliance on third party partners or a counterparty's default.

For further risks we refer to the relevant fund prospectus.

**United Kingdom:** This document is issued by Fiera Capital (UK) Limited, an affiliate of Fiera Capital Corporation. Fiera Capital (UK) Limited is authorized and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority and is registered with the US Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") as investment adviser. Registration with the SEC does not imply a certain level of skill or training.

**Abu Dhabi Global Markets:** This document is issued by Fiera Capital (UK) Limited, an affiliate of Fiera Capital Corporation. Fiera Capital (UK) Limited is regulated by the Financial Services Regulatory Authority.

**United Kingdom – Fiera Real Estate UK:** This document is issued by Fiera Real Estate Investors UK Limited, an affiliate of Fiera Capital Corporation. Fiera Real Estate Investors UK Limited is authorized and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority.

**European Economic Area (EEA):** This document is issued by Fiera Capital (Germany) GmbH ("**Fiera Germany**"), an affiliate of Fiera Capital Corporation. Fiera Germany is authorized and regulated by the Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin).

**United States:** This document is issued by Fiera Capital Inc. ("**Fiera U.S.A.**"), an affiliate of Fiera Capital Corporation. Fiera U.S.A. is an investment adviser based in New York City registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission ("**SEC**"). Registration with the SEC does not imply a certain level of skill or training.

**United States - Fiera Infrastructure:** This document is issued by Fiera Infrastructure Inc. ("**Fiera Infrastructure**"), an affiliate of Fiera Capital Corporation. Fiera Infrastructure is registered as an exempt reporting adviser with the Securities and Exchange Commission ("**SEC**"). Registration with the SEC does not imply a certain level of skill or training.

**United States - Fiera Comox:** This document is issued by Fiera Comox Partners Inc. ("**Fiera Comox**"), an affiliate of Fiera Capital Corporation. Fiera Comox is registered as an investment adviser with the Securities and Exchange Commission ("**SEC**"). Registration with the SEC does not imply a certain level of skill or training.

## Canada

**Fiera Real Estate Investments Limited ("**Fiera Real Estate**")**, a wholly owned subsidiary of Fiera Capital Corporation is an investment manager of real estate through a range of investments funds.

**Fiera Infrastructure Inc. ("**Fiera Infra**")**, a subsidiary of Fiera Capital Corporation is a leading global mid-market direct infrastructure investor operating across all subsectors of the infrastructure asset class.

**Fiera Comox Partners Inc. ("**Fiera Comox**")**, a subsidiary of Fiera Capital Corporation is a global investment manager that manages private alternative strategies in Private Credit, Agriculture, Private Equity and Timberland.

**Fiera Private Debt Inc. ("**Fiera Private Debt**")**, a subsidiary of Fiera Capital Corporation provides innovative investment solutions to a wide range of investors through two distinct private debt strategies: corporate debt and infrastructure debt.

Please find an overview of registrations of Fiera Capital Corporation and certain of its subsidiaries here:

<https://www.fieracapital.com/en/registrations-and-exemptions>.

Version STRENG004